In Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical Care Mgt. Assoc., — U.S. –, 2020 WL 7250098 (Dec. 10, 2020), the Supreme Court held that ERISA’s broad express preemption will not reach a state law that focuses on the price of prescription drug benefits that a plan chooses to provide.

The particular question in Rutledge was whether ERISA preempted an Arkansas law regulating the price at which pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) reimburse pharmacies for the cost of drugs covered by ERISA prescription drug plans. The Court described PBMs as

a little-known but important part of the process by which many Americans get their prescription drugs. Generally speaking, PBMs serve as intermediaries between prescription-drug plans and the pharmacies that beneficiaries use. When a beneficiary of a prescription-drug plan goes to a pharmacy to fill a prescription, the pharmacy checks with a PBM to determine that person’s coverage and copayment information. After the beneficiary leaves with his or her prescription, the PBM reimburses the pharmacy for the prescription, less the amount of the beneficiary’s copayment. The prescription-drug plan, in turn, reimburses the PBM.

Continue Reading Supreme Court Rules that ERISA Does Not Preempt State Law Regulating PBM Reimbursements

Believe it or not, the Supreme Court of the United States just decided whether “to have ‘actual knowledge’ of a piece of information, one must in fact be aware of it.” The Court said “yes,” and it was unanimous. Most non-lawyers (and even some lawyers) would probably be surprised that this issue was even being debated. But it was a question that had divided the lower courts, with the Sixth Circuit ruling that “actual knowledge” did not require actually seeing or reading a document that was provided. The Supreme Court agreed with the six other circuits that had concluded that “actual knowledge” means what it says. The Court’s opinion potentially holds a silver lining for defendants though when it comes to class certification.
Continue Reading Supreme Court Decision on ERISA Statute of Limitations May Help Defendants Defeat Class Certification

The Colorado Supreme Court’s decisions upholding the dismissal of claims against two separate disability plans under ERISA may be under review by the Supreme Court, following submission of the joint petition for a writ of certiorari filed in Olivar v. Public Serv. Employee Credit Union Long Term Disability Plan and Burton v. Colorado Access a/k/a Colorado Access Long Term Disability Plan, No. 17-1543.
Continue Reading To Sue Or Not To Sue Under ERISA: Circuit Split about Proper Party Defendants and Service of Process May Be Resolved

A recent decision by the Eighth  Circuit Court of Appeals, Jones v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 16-1714, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 8112 (8th Cir. May 8, 2017), provides another signal that those of us defending against benefit claims increasingly may have to contend with simultaneous equitable claims for breach of fiduciary duty. Though the law is developing in this area (when is ERISA law not “developing”?), and likely will vary from circuit to circuit, you can expect more plaintiffs to add an equitable claim to a benefits complaint, and you can expect at least some courts to allow those claims to go forward. What strategies will prove most effective in responding to this latest tactic? While there are no definitive answers at this point, there are some ideas to consider.
Continue Reading It May Be Time to Start Thinking About Equitable Claims Again

Those of us who finished law school more than five or ten years ago learned about personal jurisdiction through the lens of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and its focus on “minimum contacts” analysis. We learned that a company can be sued in any state with which it has significant, ongoing contacts, such as an office, employees or bank accounts.

That was then. Recently, the Supreme Court has begun to tell us we were all wrong for thinking that way. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). Though the Daimler majority would have us think they are simply reinforcing what International Shoe really held, Justice Sotomayor described it as “a new rule of constitutional law that is unmoored from decades of precedent.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 773. Our world has changed, and anyone suing or defending corporations must understand the new rules.
Continue Reading Personal Jurisdiction Under ERISA: Forget About Minimum Contacts

Lee v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., — F.3d –, 2016 WL 4926159 (5th Cir. Sept. 15, 2016), held that a defined benefit pension plan participant does not have Article III standing to challenge the plan’s alleged violation of ERISA, in the absence of “concrete injury” to himself.

The case is a putative class action growing out of an amendment to Verizon’s pension plan that terminated it for retirees and replaced it with an annuity. One of the claims asserted fiduciary misconduct in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a), which requires a fiduciary to “make good … any losses to the plan” from a breach of duty. In an unreported 2015 decision, 623 Fed.Appx. 132 (5th Cir. 2015) (Lee 2015), the court had affirmed the dismissal of that claim for lack of standing. Lee 2015 had held that, though the plaintiff had statutory standing to assert a violation of ERISA by a plan fiduciary, he did not have Article III standing because “standing for defined-benefit plan participants requires imminent risk of default by the plan, such that the participant’s benefits are adversely affected,” and he had not alleged any likelihood of such injury.

The plaintiff petitioned for certiorari, and the Supreme Court granted the petition and vacated Lee 2015 and remanded it for reconsideration in light of Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540 (2016). Spokeo had addressed the question whether and when a statutory violation satisfied the concrete harm required for Article III standing.  
Continue Reading “Bare violation” of ERISA without concrete injury does not confer standing

Tibble v. Edison Int’l, — F.3d –, 2016 WL 1445220 (9th Cir. Apr. 13, 2016) (“Tibble II”), marks the Ninth Circuit’s second review of the case after its earlier decision was vacated by the Supreme Court. Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S.Ct. 1823 (2015) (“Tibble I”). Tibble I concerns the commencement of the statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty under 29 U.S.C. § 1113, which provides that an action must be brought within six years of “the last action which constituted a part of the breach or violation.”
Continue Reading On Tibble remand, court finds plaintiffs forfeited continuing-duty-to-monitor argument

There is a lot about ERISA litigation that is hard to understand, but perhaps the most opaque issue is subrogation, which is the law governing when and how plans can recover benefits from participants. It seems that the Supreme Court is constantly changing the rules (while denying that it’s changing the rules), based on its interpretation of old treatises written about procedure in courts that don’t exist anymore.
Continue Reading Another SCOTUS subrogation decision, and another deep dive into equity treatises

About twenty states, including Vermont, have passed laws requiring all entities that provide health care services to report information to a state agency; these are called “all payer claims databases” or APCDs. Though they may have many purposes, they all generally are intended to enforce a universal and consistent (within the particular state, at least) submission of data that permits study, evaluation, manipulation and dissemination of the data, with an aim of improving health care outcomes and reducing costs. Of course, each state that establishes an APCD likely will have its own requirements, scope and format, which likely will differ in some respects from other states’ APCDs. And because a primary intent of ERISA was to avoid such patchwork, state-by-state regulation of employee benefit plans, a conflict was inevitable.

That conflict came to a head in Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016), and the Supreme Court held that ERISA won, by preempting Vermont’s APCD law.
Continue Reading ERISA preempts state-required “all payer claim databases” (APCD)

Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 134 S. Ct. 529 (2013), held that a contractual limitation period in an ERISA plan is enforceable as written unless the period is unreasonably short, or a “controlling statute prevents the limitations provisions from taking effect.” In Heimeshoff, there was no dispute that the contractual limitation provision was consistent with the law of the forum state (Connecticut). But what happens when the contractual limitation period is shorter than the minimum period allowed by applicable state law?
Continue Reading State Law Is Not A “Controlling Statute” Overriding Contractual Limitation