It is well-established that ERISA contains what is commonly referred to as a “church-plan exemption” which provides that plans established by churches are not required to abide by ERISA’s many rules and regulations. For many years, a number of courts have held that this exemption also applied to plans that were established by organizations that are affiliated with churches, such as schools (think Notre Dame or Georgetown) or hospitals. In two major decisions a couple of months apart, the Third and Seventh Circuits have held that the exemption is not as broad as other courts have concluded. These cases signal a major new area of ERISA litigation.
Continue Reading ERISA governs plans established by church-related organizations

In Mirza v. Ins. Administrator of Amer., Inc., 800 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2015), the court held that the failure to disclose a contractual limitation period in a denial letter precluded enforcement of that limitation, and required application of the most analogous state limitation period.

The district court had ruled, in granting summary judgment for defendant, that a lack of notice was irrelevant, because the plaintiff had knowledge of the limitation, and therefore could not benefit from the equitable tolling that might otherwise flow from a lack of required disclosure. The Third Circuit held “we do not find equitable tolling to be an obstacle, or even relevant, to Mirza’s claim.”
Continue Reading Third Circuit rules that claim denial letters must disclose contractual limitation period

In North Jersey Brain & Spine Ctr. v. Aetna, Inc., — F.3d –, 2015 WL 5295125 (3d Cir. Sep. 11, 2015), the court addressed the question “whether a patient’s explicit assignment of payment of insurance benefits to her healthcare provider, without direct reference to the right to file suit, is sufficient to give the provider standing to sue for those benefits under ERISA § 502(a)[.]”
Continue Reading Third Circuit Rules That Assignment of Plan Benefits Confers Standing to Sue

In Santomenno ex rel. John Hancock Trust v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co. (U.S.A), — F.3d –, 2014 WL 4783665 (3d Cir. Sept. 26, 2014), the plaintiffs, who were participants in employer-sponsored 401(k) benefit plans, claimed that John Hancock, an administrator that provided investment services to plans, breached its fiduciary duty by allegedly charging the retirement plans excessive fees.
Continue Reading Court Requires Nexus Between Alleged Fiduciary Duty and Alleged Damage

In Bd. of Trustees of the Nat. Elevator Indus. Health Benefit Plan v. McLaughlin,  — F.3d –, 2014 WL 4852096 (3d Cir. Oct. 1, 2014), plaintiff argued that his medical plan could not enforce an equitable lien by agreement to recover medical expenses paid because the New Jersey Collateral Source Statute (the “NJCSS”) precluded

In Mead v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., — F.3d –,  2014 WL 4548868 (2d Cir. Sept. 16, 2014), the district court determined that Reliastar’s decision on plaintiff’s disability claim was arbitrary and capricious, and remanded the matter to Reliastar to calculate the benefits owed for plaintiff’s own-occupation disability, and to determine whether she was disabled from any occupation. Reliastar appealed, and plaintiff moved to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction, arguing that the remand order was not a “final decision” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The court noted that it had “never definitively decided whether, or under what circumstances, a district court’s remand to an ERISA plan administrator is immediately appealable.” It held now that it was not appealable.
Continue Reading Second Circuit Evaluates Split in Circuits, and Rules That Order Remanding Claim to Administrator Is Generally Not Appealable

Every so often a bit of legal synchronicity seems to occur. Sometimes its personal, like when you have several cases with the same uncommon issue, or multiple cases in the same rarely visited court. In 2013, there appears to be a larger force at work that has caused three circuits to address the question whether a plan that requires proof to be satisfactory to the insurer confers discretion.

It has long been clear that a plan document must give discretionary authority to an insurer in order to require courts to conduct an arbitrary and capricious review. It is also well-established that no “magic words” are required to give discretion. However, the vast majority of plans intending to grant discretion use the magic words anyway, and say that the insurer has “discretionary authority to determine claims and construe the plan” or some variant.

But what happens when a plan does not use the magic words?  
Continue Reading Effect of Requiring “Satisfactory” Proof Is A Popular Issue in the Circuits This Year

ERISA requires fiduciaries to follow a prudent person standard regarding investment decisions. For plans requiring investment in the employer’s stock, often called Employee Stock Ownership Plans, or ESOPs, courts have developed a presumption that the investment in employer stock is prudent. A recent 9th Circuit case has addressed the limits of that presumption. Harris v. Amgen, Inc., — F.3d –, 2013 WL 2397404 (9th Cir. June 4, 2013).
Continue Reading Presumption that Plan Administrator Acted Prudently Does Not Apply in Stock-Drop Case

The Seventh Circuit has recently considered whether surveillance evidence can be relied upon in deciding ERISA-governed disability claims. Marantz v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc. Long Term Disability Plan, 2012 WL 2764792 (7th Cir. July 10, 2012), involved a de novo review of the claim determination. The claimant was a pulmonologist who developed back pain. After paying benefits for about four years, the claim administrator began to look more closely at the claim, and its investigation included surveillance. As the Seventh Circuit described it:

The surveillance video shows Dr. Marantz running across a busy street in heeled boots; shopping at Home Depot, Neiman Marcus, Loehmann’s, and Nordstrom Rack; lifting heavy items into her car; riding a stationary bike in a group exercise class at a health club; and, after the second day of the evaluation, shopping at a fur store and Petco. The investigators followed Dr. Marantz for five days, but only recorded activity on three of those days. Dr. Marantz testified that one of the surveillance days was unusual in that she was hosting a friend who was visiting Chicago from out-of-town.

Dr. Marantz argued that surveillance was “inherently unreliable.” The Seventh Circuit disagreed, but identified several situations when surveillance “is of limited utility”: “when the recorded data does not conflict with the applicant’s self reports of limitations, or when the surveillance catches limited bursts of activity that might be anomalous.”

The First Circuit has also expressed the same notion more simply: “weight given to surveillance in these sorts of cases depends both on the amount and nature of the activity observed.” Maher v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. Long Term Disability Plan, 665 F.3d 289, 295 (1st Cir. 2011).

Marantz held that the activities caught on tape were inconsistent with Dr. Marantz’s statements about what she could and could not do. Marantz also held that, because she engaged in these inconsistent activities after she had worked in her part-time job or had spent several hours in rigorous physical therapy, the activity “cannot be explained by a ‘good days/bad days’ scenario.”

Because the devil is in the details on these kind of issues, a discussion of other Circuits’ evaluation of surveillance evidence is in order.Continue Reading Looking in on Surveillance